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Ideology and Experimentation in
China’s Economic Rise:
How Opposition Spurred Growth
Ayelet Rubenstein
Introduction
China’s economic transformation from an agrarian,
undeveloped country to an advanced, industrialized nation under
an authoritarian political system has challenged some of the core
tenets espoused by new institutional economics, specifically
raising questions about the necessity of certain institutional
conditions for economic development. Economist Dani Rodrik
has challenged the idea that there are definitive institutional
prerequisites and universal best practices for economic growth,
arguing instead that successful institutional arrangements and
effective economic policies are country-specific and depend on
translating local experience into national policy making. Rodrik’s
insight can serve as an important starting point in understanding
China’s rise to dominance in the global economic arena given
that this process occurred under unorthodox institutional
arrangements. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to understand how
a state with a rigid bureaucracy was able to undergo such a striking
economic transformation. This feat is especially surprising
considering that the Chinese politicians who propelled the reform
effort faced forceful political opposition throughout the entirety
of the reform process, first attacked by ideologues who resisted
change altogether and later by more conservative politicians
who recognized the need for reform but sought to limit its scope.
In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that this ideological
controversy not only played a key role in China’s economic
development but also served as a constructive force throughout
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the process of reform. Specifically, I argue that ideological
opposition to economic reform, instead of functioning as
an obstacle to China’s economic growth, contributed to its
success by forcing Chinese reformers to adopt an effective
experimental and incremental approach to transforming the
economy that was in part facilitated by the authoritarian
environment. Although the opposition to reform was not
limited to the realm of the Communist Party of China (CPC), I
mostly focus on this dynamic within the CPC because reform
programs were initiated and regulated by Party members. In the
first section, I outline the role of ideology in the reform process.
In the second section, I explain how ideological opposition
to reform contributed to the experimental and gradual nature
of reform and use the policy of Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) as a case study, illustrating how ideological constraints
played a key role in the ultimate success of this innovative
initiative. In the final section, I discuss how the presence of
special institutional prerequisites in China was conducive
to the efficacy of the experimental approach to reform.
Ideology in China’s Economic Transformation
Before engaging in an analysis of the role ideology
played in China’s economic transformation, the concept of
ideology must be defined. Wei-wei Zhang, a Chinese historian,
defines ideology as “a set of ideas with a discursive framework
which guides and/or justifies policies and actions, derived from
certain values and doctrinal assumptions about the nature and
dynamics of history.”1 In line with this definition, ideology can
essentially be understood as referring to the values and ideas
that constitute theoretical justifications for policy. Ideology
is important for understanding the reforms that underlay
China’s economic growth because China’s political system is
by nature ideological; all policy ideas require an ideological
Penn History Review

11

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

justification. Chinese bureaucrats generally view ideology
not only as a personal commitment but also as a statement of
what they envision to be the correct course of action for China.
As such, the convention in the CPC offers an opportunity for
leaders to situate their ideas in a viable theoretical framework
in order to achieve a consensus for a given policy agenda.2
Given the ideology-oriented nature of Chinese politics,
it is unsurprising that the beginning of the reform process was
characterized by an ideological debate between post-Mao
reformers, who sought to shift the focus of Chinese politics
away from class struggle and towards economic development,
and the Cultural Revolution Left, who remained loyal to
the core tenets of Mao’s communist doctrine, a variant of
Marxism-Leninism that focused on the peasantry as the main
revolutionary force.3 Many Party members aligned themselves
with Maoism despite the fact that some of Mao’s programs
had resulted in disastrous economic consequences, specifically
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
Hua Guofeng, Mao’s successor, deliberately prioritized
elements in Maoism that would permit economic development
and contact with other countries but fundamentally remained
within the framework of Mao’s model for China. He emphasized
continuity over change and advocated for the modernization
of China without altering its existing economic structure.4
In contrast, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese
politician
who
would
spearhead
China’s
economic reforms and served as the paramount political
leader of China from 1978-1992, believed that the economic
stagnation during the years of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) had demonstrated that change was necessary.
In Deng’s view, although this crisis had diminished Mao’s
doctrine and the legitimacy of the CPC in the realm of
public opinion, it also harbored the potential to serve
as a positive catalyst for some much-needed change.5
12
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Deng’s immediate obstacle was the pervasive influence
of Maoism among Party members. He was tasked with breaking
this “monolithic attitude” by encouraging CPC members to
reevaluate their understanding of Mao’s policies and China’s
economic past.6 Deng criticized Hua for “upholding whatever
policy decisions Chairman Mao instructed” and argued for
introducing an element of critical thinking into policymaking.7
According to Deng, in order to regain the trust of the
people, the Party needed to move away from Mao’s radical
ideology, shift the emphasis from politics and revolution
to the economy and modernization, and initiate successful
market reforms that would provide the general population
with discernible benefits. However, before initiating a reform
program, Deng needed to devise and present a comprehensive
ideological justification for this course of action. Only
with ideological backing could he win the leadership
struggle against Hua and galvanize support from the Party
members, many of whom still believed in Mao’s core tenets.8
Deng introduced several aspects of his ideology at the
Third Plenum, a pivotal meeting of the Central Committee of
the CPC that took place in 1978, two years after Mao’s death.9
Although he adroitly avoided blaming Mao directly, Deng
criticized the rigid thinking of the members of the CPC during
Mao’s leadership. He encouraged Party members to “dare to
think, explore new ways and generate new ideas” going forward,
arguing that “otherwise, we won’t be able to rid our country of
poverty and backwardness.”10 He established a reform-oriented
policy agenda that prioritized modernization and emphasized
decentralization, insisting that reforming the central planning
system held the potential to increase productivity. Deng stressed
economic development as the primary goal of the Party;
this prioritization of the economy would become a defining
characteristic of his leadership. A few years later, in a talk with
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom in
Penn History Review
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1984, Deng argued that the merit of an ideology and policy
should be judged only by one criterion; namely, whether they
promote economic development.11 This statement points to a
fundamental difference between Mao’s and Deng’s approaches
to advancing China’s economy; while Mao prioritized political
and social ideology, Deng prioritized economic performance. 12
Another defining feature of Deng’s ideology
was his determination for China to chart its own path of
economic growth rather than importing policy recipes
from abroad. Deng expressed this idea in 1982 at the
Twelfth National Congress of the CPC, stating that:13
In carrying out our modernization program we must
proceed from Chinese realities… mechanical application
of foreign experience and copying of foreign models will
get us nowhere…We must integrate the universal truth of
Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of
our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Deng famously characterized his strategy of economic
modernization as “crossing the river by feeling the stones,”14
which encapsulates his belief in an experimental, gradual, and
pragmatic approach to reform.15 Deng’s developmental theme
of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” provided a flexible
framework for him to initiate and justify economic experiments
that would allow him to realize his goal of exploring a unique
path of reform and modernization. This concept reflected his
commitment to modernizing China without Westernizing it,
a position which was partly informed by his experience with
the West. Deng viewed power dynamics with the Western
world as unfavorable to less developed countries like China
and approached engagement with the West with tremendous
skepticism. In 1982, during the early period of the reform
process, he remarked that “there are still some people around
who are wedded to the ideas of the old-line colonialists; they
are reluctant to see the poor countries develop and attempt
to throttle them.”16 This theme was also derived in part from
14
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Deng’s socialist critique of Western values. Although Deng
in many ways sought to distance himself from Mao and
his theories, he still situated his reforms in the context of a
socialist discourse, believing in many of the core values of
socialism. Deng’s commitment to embarking on a unique
path of Chinese growth played a critical role in the success
of the reform process. Although he encouraged gleaning
insight from studying the experiences of foreign countries,
he understood that China would have to walk its own,
distinctive path to economic development and modernization.
Indeed, given the divergent pre existing institutional
arrangements in China and in the West, the policies that Western
economists would have recommended for China based on
Washington consensus initiatives would have been unlikely to
stimulate economic growth. For example, conventional advice
for a country working towards opening its economy includes
reducing restrictions on imports, decreasing import tariffs, and
enabling the conversion of the currency for trade transactions.
However, had the Chinese leadership followed this standard
list of recommendations, the removal of barriers to trade
would have resulted in the closure of many state enterprises
without encouraging new investments in industry, crippling
employment and economic growth. Instead, Chinese politicians
explored innovative solutions that did not exert excessive
pressure on the existing industrial infrastructure.17 Thus, this
determination to discover innovative economic solutions
contributed to the ultimate success of the reform process.
Through his developmental theme of “socialism with Chinese
characteristics,” Deng was able to galvanize enough support
to get the first of his reform initiatives off the ground.18 These
early reforms mainly consisted of rural reforms that aimed to
decentralize certain features of the planning system and were
largely modelled on the local initiatives in Sichuan in the
1970s, which laid the foundation for many future top-down
Penn History Review
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programs.19 The Sichuan reforms had been spearheaded by
Zhao Ziyang, then the local Party secretary.20 However, Deng’s
early success did not mark the end of the ideological struggle
that confronted him and other reformers. As they continued to
push for reform, a divide emerged between more conservative
reformers—which ironically refers to those on the ultraleft,
namely, those who adhered more closely to Maoist doctrine—
and more radical reformers, who advocated for more rapid and
extensive economic restructuring.21 Both camps fundamentally
agreed about opening up China’s economy and changing some
aspects of the central planning system, but disagreed about
the nature, pace, and scope of the change.22 Reform initiatives
were often attacked and sometimes tempered or blocked by
the more conservative members of the CPC. Although this
dynamic recurred throughout the reform process, I will focus
on one example in order to illustrate the nature of this pattern.
In early 1983, following the success of rural reforms
in improving productivity and increasing agricultural output,
Deng and other reformers took steps to expand these reforms
to urban areas. Specifically, in Chongqing, a city with a
population in the low millions, reformers initiated changes
with the goal of decentralizing certain aspects of the central
planning system. Planning was allowed to be carried out under
national as opposed to provincial control, individual sectors
were expanded, housing was commercialized, and enterprises
were granted more agency in decision-making.23 Similar
changes were adopted in other large cities, such as Wuhan.
However, these developments were met with ideological
opposition from the conservative camp. The Chinese
newspaper Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) responded with
an article entitled “It is Necessary to Adhere to the Planned
Economy”, arguing that reform should adhere to socialist
values and not “weaken the planned economy.”24 Although
this opposition failed to impact reforms on the grassroots
16

Ayelete Rubenstein

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

level, it prevented Deng from gaining a leadership consensus
that would have allowed him to institute more radical forms.25
This pattern of reform followed by ideological attack
that served to restrain the implementation of further changes
recurred throughout the years of Deng’s leadership. Because
of this, Wei-Wei Zhang argues that the course of political and
ideological change from 1978-1993 should be divided into
four main periods that can be classified as cycles because
each stage was marked by a period of advance, consisting of
reformist values and initiatives, followed by one of retreat,
involving ideological criticism of the reforms and consequent
readjustment.26 This dynamic affected the nature of reform
in two ways. Along with other factors, it forced many of the
reforms to take the shape of small-scale pilot experiments from
the outset because ideological constraints would have prevented
the implementation of the reforms on a national scale, and it
also served to temper the pace of reform once reforms were
implemented, forcing the process to progress incrementally,
gradually, and deliberately, often prompting the reevaluation
and revision of reform programs.27 The trial-oriented and
gradual nature of the reform process, as will be outlined in more
detail, played a major role in the ultimate success of many of the
reform initiatives and thereby in China’s overall economic rise.
The Experimental and Incremental Nature of China’s
Economic Reforms
Before analyzing the experimental character of China’s
economic reforms, it is important to note that ideological
controversy was not the only factor that caused the process to
operate in an experimental and incremental manner. Arguably,
the primary challenge for the reformers was to figure out how
to shift a system whose characteristics and mechanisms had
become ingrained over a twenty-year period.28 They had to
Penn History Review
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find innovative solutions to reshape market structures and
open up China’s economy while working with the preexisting
institutional and economic arrangements that were structured
around the central planning system and virtual economic
isolation from the rest of the world.29 Nonetheless, ideological
opposition also served as an important restraining force on
the process of reform, and without this factor, even given
the institutional obstacles, the reform process likely would
have occurred faster and on a larger scale. If the reformers
had never struggled to gain consensus on their initiatives,
the reform process would most likely not have been as
experiment-based or as gradual. Thus, by limiting the scale
and pace of reform, ideological controversy contributed to the
experimental and incremental nature of these developments.
Although Deng and other reformers wanted to adopt
many of their reforms on a larger scale, they were forced to
initiate many of their projects via small-scale pilot experiments
due to ideological constraints.30 Of course, many of the
initiatives also took this form simply because the reformers
did not know which policies would succeed, but again, these
reforms likely would have been adopted on a larger scale
without the ideological opposition of more conservative
members of the Party. The ideological constraints on reform
were a significant determinant of the experimental nature of
these reforms, and the fact that these reforms were confined
to small scale experiments was tremendously fortuitous; it
prevented the reformers from adopting rash policies on the
national level. Instead, the experimental initiatives functioned
to allow the reformers to see which policies fostered favorable
economic outcomes and which hampered growth under
local conditions, ultimately allowing for the “selective
integration of local experiences into national policymaking.”31
For much of China’s economic transformation,
experimental initiatives were the dominant mode of economic
18
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reform. In the early to mid 1980s, approximately half of all the
national regulations in China had explicitly experimental status.
32
As Rodrik explains, “through experimentation, China’s policy
makers sought to discover solutions that would overcome
their constraints and be more suited to local conditions.”33 A
significant part of the success of the experimental policies was
that after each period of advance in the reform process, Party
members had to evaluate and readjust certain elements of every
program before surging ahead with new initiatives.34 Although
in the short term this dynamic may appear to have restricted
the pace of reform, and perhaps in individual cases, did indeed
have this effect, this paradigm had a valuable impact on the
long term process of economic growth. The pattern of advance,
ideological attack, and consequent revision ensured that future
reforms were thoroughly thought out and directly based
on the outcomes of the experiments under local conditions.
The establishment of the Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) illustrates this process of experimentation, ideological
critique, and readjustment and is broadly representative of how
this sequence manifested in many of China’s other reforms. As
an experiment for opening up China’s economy to the outside
world, certain regions within China were granted more flexible
policies in foreign trade in order to attract foreign technology
and investment.35 The approach of limiting the process of
opening up to small-scale experimentation proved to be very
effective. If reformers had jumped to open up larger areas
faster by eliminating barriers to trade, this likely would have
caused state owned enterprises to close without substantially
stimulating new investments in industrial activities, increasing
unemployment, and impeding economic growth.36 Deng was
very attuned to the experimental nature of this initiative and
the potential advantages of implementing this type of pilot
policy. In the summer of 1985, Deng disclosed to a visiting
Algerian delegation the following remarks regarding the
Penn History Review
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Shenzhen SEZ that had been established five years earlier37:
The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an experiment. It will
be some time before we know whether we are doing the right
thing there. It is something new under socialism. We hope to
make it a success, but if it fails, we can learn from the experience.

Unsurprisingly, the experiment of the SEZs was met with
sharp ideological critique. The Chinese media invoked
egalitarian values to criticize the increasing inequality of
income between the SEZs, coastal areas, and poorer inner
regions and pointed to the reemergence of exploitation in
private enterprises. Advocates of central planning within the
CPC argued that the special privileges conferred to foreign
investors as a part of this policy constituted a concession to
Western powers. In late 1985, students joined this crusade
and protested in Beijing, specifically claiming that China’s
open-door policy involved excessive concessions to Japan.38
This mounting opposition to the SEZs escalated to the point
that Party members, fearful of this rising trend and the threat
it posed to their authority, decided to reevaluate this policy.
In the process of revisiting the SEZs, the reformers
found that the performance of the SEZs was not as successful
as expected up to this point. Increasing economic costs, the
lack of high-tech industries, foreign exchange imbalances, and
disproportionate infrastructure spending demonstrated that
the SEZs had not achieved their original goals of attracting
foreign technology and facilitating a successful exportoriented strategy.39 Though due to these outcomes it is likely
that reformers would have reevaluated the SEZ policies
on their own volition, ideological attacks—specifically,
widespread protest with underlying ideological justification—
were the immediate impetus to this reconsideration. Because
of the opposition to this policy, “reformers were under
strong pressure to explore other policy alternatives for SEZ
development that could produce fast and visible results.”40
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The reformers realized that their original strategy for
the SEZs was too ambitious and radical to succeed. By late
1985, they formulated a new and more realistic strategy based
on the results of the experiment of the SEZs up to that point.
They revised their targets to focus on pragmatic, short-term
objectives rather than a vision of a distant endpoint. For example,
they adopted the realistic goal of advancing small and medium
enterprises that would promote better-quality manufacturing
and light industry.41 They also implemented a “two way” strategy
in which zones would use foreign investment and technology
to develop an industrial capacity that would allow them to
compete in the international export market.42 The domestic
market would also be used to develop an export-oriented
economy, and the home market would be selectively opened
to zone-based foreign enterprises if they utilized advanced
technology. As a result, the SEZs would function in a reciprocal
manner, not only leading to China’s participation in the world
market but also bringing world market forces into China.43
By the middle of 1987, this revised strategy had yielded
positive results. The SEZs had become export-oriented, and
foreign investment had multiplied. In June, Deng declared the
ultimate success of the SEZs and stated this explicitly in a talk
with a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia44:
The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an experiment. It will
be some time before we know whether we are doing the right
thing there. It is something new under socialism. We hope to
make it a success, but if it fails, we can learn from the experience.

The improvement of the SEZs as a result of this process
highlights the critical role of ideological opposition in
modulating reform. Ideological critique functioned as the
immediate catalyst that propelled the reformers to refine and
revise the less effective aspects of the SEZ strategy, ultimately
leading to marked improvement in the outcomes of this policy.
From the outset, ideological constraints proved helpful in
Penn History Review

21

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

limiting the implementation of SEZs by restricting the scope
of reform. By confining this experiment to a smaller scale,
ideological controversy, among other factors, allowed this
policy to be implemented and later revised without engendering
the widespread economic setbacks that likely would have
transpired had China opened up their economy on a national
level. Although the example of the SEZ is perhaps particularly
clear-cut in exhibiting this dynamic, this trend is evident in many
of the other reforms that stimulated China’s economic growth.45
The Context of the Experimental Approach: China’s
Institutions
The efficacy of the experimental approach to reform
in China was likely in part due the presence of certain
pre-existing institutional prerequisites. Specifically, the
authoritarian political system dominated by the CPC involves
certain features that are conducive to policy experimentation.
The Party’s unitary organization and unified commitment
to economic modernization, the lack of vulnerability of
Party members to electoral cycles, and the fact that China’s
economy was growing but relatively less advanced fostered an
environment in which policymakers were willing to take some
risks via experimental reforms.46 These conditions created
a unique set of circumstances in which Party policymakers,
secure in their own power, were willing to take political risks
in launching experimental reforms with the hope of boosting
China’s economy. This experimental and incremental approach
to reform likely would not have been as successful in a more
advanced political economy under more democratic conditions.
Sebastian Heilman, a political scientist who specializes in
China, explains that in an advanced political economy “most
policymakers, administrators, interest groups and citizens…
tend to view experimental policy departures as risky,
22
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destabilizing, and threatening to their stakes in the status quo.”47
Although the political system of an authoritarian
government allows for policy experimentation, which may
in turn stimulate economic growth, it is also important
to recognize that experimentation within the context of a
rigid bureaucratic government is limited in its capacity to
provide people with social and public goods. Implementing
policies that grant access to health care, protection of
land tenure rights, and environmental protection involves
imposing national policy priorities in response to societal
advocacy that would oppose the short-term interests of
most local elites.48 Thus, while China’s economic reforms
were successful in invigorating the economy, they were
accompanied by a host of social problems and needs, many
of which were not alleviated until years later or not at all.49
Similarly, although many theories point to
economic growth as a precursor to political liberalization,
democratization did not immediately follow China’s economic
development, perhaps illustrated most poignantly by the
Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989.50 The lack of democracy
is a fundamental part of this story, and in fact, this arrangement
made the role of ideological opposition all the more critical.
According to Zhang, ideological controversy takes on
additional significance in “the absence of institutionalized
democracy because it generates pressure on reformers to
act with prudence for tangible results, and it guards against
any simplistic approach to China’s complicated economic
problems.”51 Not only did ideological critique contribute
to the success of reforms by forcing them to be exploratory
and gradual but it also served as a kind of quasi-democratic
check on China’s authoritarian political system, functioning
as a channel in which public demands wielded some degree of
influence over the political considerations of Party members.
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Conclusion
Ideological opposition played a central role in the
process of reforming China’s economy, serving as a restraining
force that shaped the experimental and gradual character of
the reforms. By limiting new initiatives to small-scale pilot
programs, this dynamic allowed Chinese policymakers to see
what worked on the local level before they adopted policies
on the national scale. Furthermore, ideological critique
encouraged the reexamination and consequent improvement
of reform programs, as exhibited by the example of the SEZs.
The experimental approach to reform was in part enabled by
China’s existing institutional arrangements, as the authoritarian
political system contributed to Chinese leaders’ affinity for
a trial-based strategy. The unconventional story of China’s
economic rise thus supports the idea that a successful path to
economic development depends on pre-existing institutional
arrangements. A given institutional framework in one place
may facilitate a certain approach to economic growth, and
policy experimentation, in environments in which it is
possible, bears the potential to demonstrate which programs
yield positive outcomes under local conditions. China’s
economic growth highlights the potential benefits of charting
a unique path to growth instead of attempting to replicate the
experiences of other countries, serving to underscore that
there is no universal formula for economic development.

24

Ayelete Rubenstein

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

Notes
1 Zhang, Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping, 5.
2 Ibid, 2.
3 Ibid, 6.
4 Ibid, 21.
5 Ibid.
6 Christopher Howe, Y. Y. Kueh, and Robert F. Ash, China’s Economic
Reform: A Study with Documents (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 12.
7 Zhang, 20.
8 Ibid, 22.
9 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China.
10 Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and
Unite as One in Looking to the Future” (December 13, 1978), in Speeches
and Writings, (Oxford: Pergamon, 1984), 65.
11 Deng Xiaoping, “China will Always Keep its Promises” (December 19,
1984), in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992, (Taiwan: Foreign
Languages Press, 1994), 109.
12 Zhang, 107.
13 Deng Xiaoping, “Opening Speech at the 12th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China” (September 1, 1982), in Selected Works of
Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992, (Taiwan: Foreign Languages Press, 1994),
13-15.
14 Mōzhe shítou guòhé
15 Bernard Z. Keo, “Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Deng
Xiaoping in the Making of Modern China,” October 19, 2020, https://
www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/crossing-the-river-byfeeling-the-stones-deng-xiaoping-in-the-making-of-modern-china/.
16 Deng Xiaoping, “China’s Historical Experience in Economic Construction” (May 6, 1982), The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, accessed
May 5, 2020, https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/
chinas-historical-experience-in-economic-construction/.
17 Dani Rodrik, “Chapter 7: Poor Countries in a Rich World,” in The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t
Coexist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 150-152.

Penn History Review

25

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

18 Zhōngguó tèsè shèhuìzhǔyì
19 Zhang, 22.
20 Ibid, 34- 35.
21 Perry Link, An Anatomy of Chinese: Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 250.
22 Zhang, 19.
23 Ibid, 103-104.
24 “It is Necessary to Adhere to the Planned Economy,” Jingji Ribao,
(November 10, 1983), quoted in Wei-Wei Zhang, Ideology and Economic
Reform under Deng Xiaoping: 1978-1993 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 105.
25 Zhang, 95.
26 Ibid, 8.
27 Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,” 4.
28 Christopher Howe, Y. Y. Kueh, and Robert F. Ash, China’s Economic
Reform: A Study with Documents, 9.
29 Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, 150.
30 Zhang, 95.
31 Heilmann, 23.
32 Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, 150.
33 Ibid.
34 Zhang, 9.
35 Ibid, 196.
36 Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, 152.
37 Deng Xiaoping, “Reform and Opening to the Outside World are a
Great Experiment” (June 29, 1985), in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
1982-1992 (Taiwan: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 134.
38 Zhang, 140-141.
39 Ibid, 139.
40 Ibid, 142.
41 Ibid, 143.
42 Ibid.
43 Zhang, 143.
44 Deng Xiaoping, “We Shall Speed Up Reform” (June 12, 1987), The

26

Ayelete Rubenstein

Ideology and Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, accessed May 6, 2020, https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-shall-speed-up-reform/.
45 Zhang, 8.
46 Heilmann, 5.
47 Ibid, 24.
48 Heilmann, 19.
49 Joe C.B. Leung, “Social Welfare in China,” in East Asian Welfare
Regimes in Transition: From Confucianism to Globalisation (Bristol:
Bristol University Press, 2005), 49.
50 Mary E Gallagher, “‘Reform and Openness:’ Why China’s Economic
Reforms Have Delayed Democracy,” World Politics 54, no. 3 (2002):
338.
51 Zhang, 222-223.

Penn History Review

27

